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Abstract 
This thesis examines firm performance through the dot-com bubble through the lens of 
executive compensation. Hypotheses based on the theoretical literature of Bolton, 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) as well as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) in regards to 
management compensation in a speculative bubble motivate three regression models with 
differing market-cap-growth based dependent variables and specific compensation 
variables. Regression analyses test the models using public compensation and security 
data from S&P’s Execucomp and Compustat databases. Synthesizing regression results 
show that stock option vesting schedules and executives’ status on the board of directors 
may significantly affect firm performance through the dot-com bubble, but more analysis, 
using more robust data, is necessary to verify either claim.   
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Introduction  
  
On March 10, 2000, in the wake of the dot-com bubble, the NASDAQ index price 
rose to its all time high of $5,048.62, more than double its value only a year previous 
($2381.53 on 3/12/1999), a level that it has never passed since. Like all bubbles this one 
eventually had to pop. The NASDAQ got to this point based on massive firm 
overvaluation fueled by now-seemingly hysterical beliefs of the value of an internet 
venture. Many firms reporting zero revenues were granted huge valuations and VC 
capital as investors abandoned fundamental analysis in favor of “the next big thing.” 
Once analysts and investors saw how quickly these firms were burning through their 
cash, with little return on investment, the firms were severely devalued and the burst was 
on; paper millionaires were brought back down to earth. 
 
 Source: Compustat 
That incentives drive behavior is one of the fundamental assumptions of 
economic theory. With that in mind a heterogeneous set of incentives will most likely 
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result in a heterogeneous set of responses. This readily applies to the field of executive 
compensation; which incentive scheme will result in the behavior most desirable to a 
firm’s shareholders?  This paper will examine the set of incentive schemes of firms in the 
NASDAQ (as available through S&P’s Execucomp) just prior to the infamous dot-com 
bubble and examine their relationship to firm performance through that market shock. 
Analysis will start at a high-level and through different data cuts zoom into the high tech 
industry itself. While the cause of the bubble can mostly be attributed to overzealous 
investors abandoning fundamentals, this paper is looking to see if the institutional 
decision of management compensation has any effect on whether a firm survives the 
bubble. This analysis aims to bring to light some survival characteristics of a 
compensation philosophy, and further analysis of the highest performing survivors will 
hopefully expose an ideal set of characteristics. Examining the relationship between 
management incentives and firm performance during a time of extreme turmoil will 
provide a unique lens through which to view the market and high tech industry as a 
whole. 
 Theoretical literature informs this papers’ empirical analysis of executive 
compensation through the dot-com bubble. Two theoretical articles, the first by Bolton, 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) and the second by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), use 
principal agent theory as a basis to attempt an explanation of manager behavior through 
the bubble. The uniqueness of a bubble ultimately affects the decision making behavior 
of the manager and these papers attempt to reconcile this behavior with speculative 
bubble conditions. From these studies I am able to formulate three hypotheses regarding 
compensation through the bubble. The first hypothesis is based on an unadjusted (to the 
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unique conditions of a speculative bubble) principal agent model suggested by 
Holmström and Tirole (1993) and claims that the more a manager is compensated with 
ownership of the company, through stock and stock options, the more their decisions are 
aligned with the owners of the firm and thus should promote higher firm performance. 
This hypothesis doesn’t take into any special account the speculative bubble, but could be 
the most correlated since this type of compensation has been traditionally the most 
accepted. In other words even though there may be a more sophisticated theory arguing 
for better incentives, managers may believe that they are being incentivized accordingly 
and perform well regardless. Bolton et al. (2006) adjust Holmström and Tirole (1993)’s 
model by dividing management and ownership behavior into two parts, long-term value 
creating and short-term speculative behavior. This adjustment suggests the second 
hypothesis that longer vesting periods and director terms should incentivize more long-
term value creating behavior and thus better performance through a bubble. The third 
hypothesis is based on the skimming theory provided by Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2001). They argue that in some firms managers are too involved in the pay setting 
process and can create compensation schemes that provide them with high payouts and 
lower thresholds to meet those payouts. Thus hypothesis three suggests a negative 
correlation between managers on the compensation committee and on the board of 
directors. 
 Regression analysis will be based on three models each treating firm performance 
slightly differently. This analysis will be evaluated through different scopes of industry 
by first focusing on the entire market and then looking at high tech specifically. Data cuts 
differentiating top executives at a firm will also be evaluated. These different dependent 
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variables will be based on firm performance above market performance with slight 
adjustments for success and survival. Looking at the years 1998 through 2002 provides a 
robust enough time before and after the “true” bubble and its burst to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the firm’s performance. 
This analysis hopes to give insight to compensation committees, investors, 
managers, and the like, on how well a company is equipped to survive a speculation 
bubble through their management incentives. In an economy of boom and bust 
speculation bubbles have been a constant: most recently cropping up in real estate 
causing a finance industry meltdown which triggered a worldwide recession. With the 
seemingly inevitable fate of speculation bubbles, it is in the best interest of a firm and its 
shareholders to properly incentivize managers to survive and perform in the event of a 
catastrophic bubble event. While this paper chooses to focus on a specific industry and 
bubble, it will be a good test as to whether or not this kind of analysis is an effective tool 
that should be applied to different industries and events. The purpose of this analysis is 
not to provide an end all solution to compensation, but hopefully answer some questions 
and spur on even more to be answered in the future. 
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Related Literature  
Looking specifically at executive compensation through the dot-com bubble 
academia has primarily focused on microeconomic theory rather than empirical research. 
Not surprisingly the bulk of theoretical work is focused on arguing for certain principal-
agent models.   
With the dot-com bubble in mind, Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) adjust 
the principal-agent theory of management compensation to account for speculative 
bubbles. They note that in speculative bubbles investors begin to speculate against each 
other due to “heterogeneous beliefs” and overconfidence. This amounts to a game of 
chicken where the higher the stock price goes the more each investor stands to make and 
as soon as no one wants to one-up anymore the stock crashes. The new model is adapted 
from the classical view often credited in the paper to Holmström and Tirole (1993) to 
“[reconcile] the agency perspective on stock compensation with the recent corporate 
crisis.” In this model Speculation is built into the model of stock prices (a short-term 
speculative component), and into management’s task problem (how management splits 
time between tasks that will increase long-term value and tasks that drive short-term 
speculation). Management is often incentivized to value this short-term gain over long-
term value creation, and the fact that institutional investors usually have share turnover of 
about a year means that there is little “long-term discipline on firm managers.” The 
authors argue against other research that blamed poor corporate governance on the bubble 
(claiming that corporate governance strengthened over the period), and that in fact the 
bubble was a symptom of the speculative nature of the shareholders. They continue, the 
best way to achieve long-term value maximization would be to “lengthen stock-option 
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vesting periods, lengthen director terms, insulate the board of directors more from market 
swings, and more generally take steps ensuring that controlling shareholders (or the board 
of directors) have a longer-term outlook.”  
 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) examine how executive pay reacts to luck 
(company success out of the executive’s control, i.e. a speculative bubble) and argues that 
in poorly governed firms executive pay is more tied to luck. The authors develop a theory 
and then through three empirical, industry cases go about testing their hypotheses. While 
their industry choices (oil, and traded goods) aren’t high-tech, their approach is useful in 
its contrarian viewpoint to Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) on executive pay 
theory, as well as their methodology in an industry study through the lens of executive 
compensation. The authors propose an alternative to the classical contracting view called 
skimming. The basic idea of skimming is that while governance and management are 
supposed to be separate, managers can easily affect the “pay-setting process” through 
favorable board members and the complexity of the process, and these effects are 
amplified when the company is performing well and the pay-setting process becomes 
even less strict.  
Empirically, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) try to find correlation between 
pay for luck, argued to be positively correlated to skimming activity, and specific firm 
governance characteristics.  Their measures for good governance are “presence of large 
shareholders (on the board and overall), CEO tenure…, board size, and traction of 
directors that are insiders.” Using their empirical data, on the oil industry specifically and 
then more generally, the authors found that for the poorly governed firms behaved as the 
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skimming model would predict: paying highly for luck. The well governed firm ended up 
behaving as typically described by the classic contracting model, but still unable to 
completely avoid paying for luck. 
Both of these studies represent the two prevailing theories about executive 
compensation during a speculative bubble, and, importantly for my purposes, aren’t 
mutually exclusive. The main point of contention in these theories is what the main driver 
of executive short-termist behavior is, without disregarding the other viewpoint entirely. 
The empirical focus of this paper will be able to leverage both aspects of these theories to 
shape its regressions and hopefully find some drivers for speculation-bubble survival. 
The main difference between previous research and the research of this paper is that 
previous research focused just on how different incentive plans affect executive behavior 
during the bubble, but this paper is more interested in how incentive plans affect firm 
performance not necessarily just how they affect executive behavior.     
Theory 
 Principal-agent theory lies at the heart of this paper. The basic theory and its 
updated forms for speculative bubbles, proposed by Bolton, et al. (2006) and Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2001), will inform the hypotheses that this paper aims to test for the 
dot-com bubble. Based on this variety of theory, there are three hypotheses that arise and 
seem the most natural to be tested. Each hypothesis will look at the correlation of certain 
devices of an incentive plan and its firm’s financial performance as measured by market 
cap growth, a quick and dirty valuation of the firm itself. As such the three hypotheses 
are: 1) as stock grants and stock options increase as a fraction of overall pay, market cap 
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growth will increase; 2) longer vesting periods for stock and stock option grants will be 
positively correlated with market cap growth more so than simply their existence; 3) less 
executive involvement in pay setting and longer board membership terms will be 
positively correlated with market cap growth. 
 Behind all of these theories is the idea that speculation and speculative bubbles 
drive management to behave in such a way that values short-term growth rather than 
long-term value creation. In the midst of the dot-com bubble and its drastic overvaluation 
of fundamentally flawed firms, a manager could stand to gain quite a bit by capitalizing 
on the bubble. This could be executed through a variety of different actions. Managers of 
firms outside of the high tech or internet based industries could quickly drive up share 
price by acquiring or investing in a high tech firm that may not provide any long-term 
benefit to the firm. Stock already owned by the executive would increase in value and 
performance targets based on stock price would be exceeded. Internet and high tech firm 
managers seeing this speculation bubble can stand to benefit from artificially driving up 
valuation by spending precious venture capital and equity capital on over-aggressive 
advertising (Jensen, 2005). This short term value creation pitched as ways to increase 
customer base (the driving force behind projected returns on many internet based 
ventures) often over spent the capabilities of the firm and increased the burn rate of their 
capital (which ended up spurring the revaluations that popped the bubble). The 
compensation theories directing this paper aim to explain what elements of that 
compensation encourage this kind of short-term behavior. 
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 Basic principal agent theory boils down to asymmetric information. The principal, 
or the owner, has a unique self interest, and the agent has a self interest of its own. In the 
case of a large corporation the agent acts on behalf of the shareholders, but because they 
don’t have the same interest as the shareholders may perform in a way that goes against 
the interests of the shareholders. This problem is solved by contracting; contracting aims 
to align the interests of the principal and the agent. This type of contracting can come in 
many shapes and sizes. Tipping in some service sectors achieves this, as does 
performance bonuses in other industries. By contracting around the principal-agent 
problem monitoring costs can be greatly reduced. When an agent is incentivized to 
perform for the benefit of the firm, agents don’t need to spend as much time, effort, and 
capital on monitoring the performance of its employees. Contracting is especially 
important at the top of a firm. Top executives have total control of a firm’s activities and 
therefore can be the most difficult and costly to properly monitor.  Aligning their 
incentives is paramount to the long-term success of a firm. 
 Owners primarily incentivize executives using company stock and stock options. 
Since top executives have the most control of the firm their actions and strategic 
decisions should have the most direct impact on stock price performance. This idea has 
been studied throughout academia and has been accepted by many economists. Bolton, 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) expand on the theory of Holmström and Tirole (1993) so 
it is useful to explore Holmström and Tirole’s take on executive compensation without 
the speculative adjustments. Homlström and Tirole argue in favor of stock as an efficient 
way to design a contract; liquid stock provides invaluable market monitoring of the firm 
and is a useful gauge of the performance of the firm and consequently the executive. 
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They argue that there are three types of investors in the market: insiders, liquidity traders, 
and informed speculators. Speculators have private information that flows into the market 
through their activities. It is easier for these speculators to disguise their information and 
profit from it when there are more liquidity traders (i.e. non-informed traders). This 
allows the stock price to have an effective monitoring effect. The effectiveness increases 
when the stock is more liquid in the market and speculators will have more incentive to 
“monitor” the firm. Since stock is an effective tool for monitoring, and presuming 
managers know this, by increasing stock as a portion of compensation the CEO is 
compelled to do what is in the best interest of value of the equity, in other words the 
interest of the owners. 
 Hypothesis 1: As equity has an effective monitoring effect, an optimal contract 
will emphasize equity as pay. Thus as equity increases in pay, so to should firm 
performance. 
 Bolton et al. (2006) argue that during a speculation bubble management’s task 
problem (how they spend their time) contains a speculative behavior component which 
compels hypothesis two. In simplest terms the proposed basic model of a firm’s long 
term value described by the authors is: e = u + v + ε. The first two terms are two 
different types of project a manager can choose from. u is a project with higher long-term 
expected return represented as a normally distributed random variable where the mean is 
a function of the manager’s effort and his return on effort. v is has an inferior long-term 
expected return, but is prone to overvaluation by investors. This is the speculative or 
“castle in the air” project. ε accounts for random “noise.” In a speculative atmosphere the 
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authors show that the CEO will prefer the v when the speculative coefficient (referred to 
in the paper as K) is high. K increases as differences of opinions become greater, and the 
difference increase with more short-term focused shareholders. The authors argue that 
increasing vesting periods of the stock options will remedy this problem. 
Hypothesis 2: Increasing the vesting term in equity related grants should compel 
CEO’s to choose long-term value creating projects over short-term speculative projects, 
thus as vesting term increases so should firm performance over the period of the bubble. 
Bolton et al. are specifically addressing the skimming theory proposed by 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). As mentioned earlier Bertrand and Mullainathan’s 
paper shows that CEO’s that skim have “captured the pay-setting process” consistently 
are paid more for shocks in the firm’s performance outside of the CEO’s control. Firms 
with less CEO involvement in pay setting pay CEO’s less for luck.  
Hypothesis 3: Removing executive involvement in the pay setting process should 
allow owners to properly incentivize executives, so firms with executives not on the 
board or compensation committee will have higher firm performance over the period of 
the bubble. 
Data  
 Executive Compensation Data 
 Executive compensation data was pulled from S&P’s Execupcomp database 
through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The database is a collection of the 
publicly available executive compensation data that all public companies must report 
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through their annual proxy statement. The Execucomp database itself mostly covers S&P 
1500 companies and former S&P 1500 companies. They also noted that some companies 
are reported at the request of their clients. The original sample pulled all available 
compensation data from Execucomp for companies publicly trading on the NASDAQ 
exchange for fiscal year 1998. The decision to focus on NASDAQ was based primarily 
on its role as a tech driven exchange and the epicenter of the dot-com bubble. Specified 
by S&P’s proprietary GVKEY permanent firm identifier, this sample consisted of 
compensation data for multiple executives at 634 unique firms and 3722 unique 
executives. While many compensation variables offered are through the database very 
few had consistent data throughout the set. With this in mind I based my analysis on 
executives with complete data on total direct compensation (total compensation for the 
year including present value of long-term incentives), stock option grants, restricted stock 
grants, director status, and compensation committee status. This completeness 
requirement lowered the total of unique firms to 617 and 3018 unique executives. Even 
with these considerations the compensation data was still far from uniform and certain 
executives were more robustly covered than others. To account for this I designated a top 
executive for each firm. This executive would be the flag bearer in a sense for the firm in 
a “top executives” cut so that would counteract the skewness caused by firms with more 
executives or more robustly reported executives. This also provides an interesting role 
dichotomy to analyze. The spirit of the top executive isn’t the highest paid executive, but 
the executive with the most power and influence (in other words the most power to affect 
shareholder value through decision making). Often times these top executives can 
embody the spirit of the company and thus they may be incentivized by something other 
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than direct pay. Steve Jobs for example only took home $1 in total direct compensation as 
CEO of Apple Inc. in 1998, with the gains on his founding equity and love of the 
company as pure motivation. 
 Total direct compensation was used as the baseline monetary compensation 
variable. Hypothesis 1 predicts that as the equity portion of compensation increases the 
market performance should increase as well because it provides efficient monitoring of 
the executive. In order to test this hypothesis the variable TDC_EQUITY_PCT was 
created. This variable is the combined values of any stock options granted and restricted 
stock grants over the total direct compensation. The value of the stock options granted 
was expressed as the Execucomp variable OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE. This is the 
value of the stock option awards calculated by S&P using the Black-Scholes model 
reported in thousands of dollars. Restricted stock grant value was determined using the 
Execucomp variable RSTKGRNT. This is the value of the stock grant in thousands of 
dollars. A grant of restricted stock is one that is restricted in the sense that the grantee 
doesn’t have control of the stock until certain conditions are met usually based on 
performance and a vesting period. These two variables were added together and divided 
by variable TDC1. TDC1 is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, value 
of restricted stock granted, value of stock options granted using Black-Scholes, long-term 
incentive payouts, and all other compensation in thousands of dollars. This is described 
by S&P as the “total compensation for the individual year.”  
 OPTIONS_EX_PER_UNEX is an attempt to incorporate a long-term growth 
focused variable into the analysis. Hypothesis 2 draws from the research of Bolton et al. 
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(2006) in that executives in a speculative bubble have a divided task problem and that 
compensation schemes can properly incentivize long-term growth tasks over short-term 
speculative tasks. They suggest that increased vesting periods and longer director terms 
can create this incentive. Execucomp data was severely lacking in any vesting data and 
its director database had no inclusion of term length. Execucomp did have a variable 
called RSTKVYRS described as the years until the restricted stock grant begins to vest if it 
was less than three years. This could be useful as it provides some insight in the focus of 
the plan, but it doesn’t provide any information after three years including the overall 
period of the vesting. Even with its drawbacks, this data would have been desirable, but 
out of the 3018 executives only one had a RSTKVYRS value less than three years. While 
the explicit vesting data wasn’t available, calculating OPTIONS_EX_PER_UNEX could 
still provide insight into the long-term focus of the compensation scheme. 
OPTIONS_EX_PER_UNEX is essentially the percentage of unexercised options that are 
actually exercisable. This was calculated using two Execucomp variables: 
OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM and OPT_UNEX_UNEXER_NUM. 
OPTIONS_EX_PER_UNEX is the percentage of total unexercised options (the sum of the 
two _NUM variables) that is attributed to exercisable options. This tries to show how 
weighted-towards-the-future the vesting schedule of the options is. In other words plans 
with longer vesting schedules should have higher levels of unexercisable options, and 
thus lower OPTIONS_EX_PER_UNEX. Obviously this statistic is not without flaws. The 
decision to exercise an option is very idiosyncratic. It is influenced by strike price and the 
market conditions, the personal finances of the executive, and confidence in future 
growth by the executive to name a few. By looking at number of options rather than 
Chambers 20 
 
value of in-the-money options (a variable provided by Execucomp) I have attempted to 
remove some of the market influences from this statistic. The goal is to have this statistic 
best represent the plan without any of the other outside influence.  
 Hypothesis 3, motivated by the skimming theory, aims to test whether executive 
involvement in the pay-setting process influences firm performance through the dot-com 
bubble. This involvement can be measured by an executive sitting on the board of 
directors or the compensation committee. Execucomp had data on both of these variables 
through the EXECDIR and INTERLOCK variables. EXECDIR (renamed DIR for this 
analysis) is a binary variable where 1 indicates that the executive served on the board of 
directors during the fiscal year, and 0 meaning they did not. INTERLOCK (renamed 
COMP_COMIT for this analysis) indicates that the executive was listed in the 
compensation committee interlocks section of the proxy with a 1, and 0 if they did not. 
The interlocks section mentions any “executive who serves on the compensation 
committee of his firm, serves on the board (and possibly the compensation committee) of 
a firm that has an executive serving on the compensation committee of the executive, and 
serves on the compensation committee of another firm that has an executive serving on 
the board of the executive’s firm (and possibly the compensation committee) (Wharton 
Research Data Services).” 
 Control variables such as location and industry were also calculated using 
Execucomp data. Considering the focus of the dot-com bubble, binary industry variables 
HIGH_TECH and the more specific INTERNET were created. Execucomp provided 
NAICS codes and proprietary GICS industry group descriptions. HIGH_TECH assigned 
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a value of 1 to any firm that had a NAICS code that was listed in TechAmerica’s NAICS 
based definition of the high tech industry, or was in a GICS industry group described 
with the word “internet”, and was assigned a 0 to firms that didn’t. INTERNET simply 
assigned values of 1 to firms with “internet” in their GICS industry group description and 
0 to those that didn’t. This designation allowed for industry controls in a total NASDAQ 
sample regression and a HIGH_TECH sample regression in which INTERNET would be 
the new industry control (Langsner, 2009).  
 A binary control for location, specifically for Silicon Valley, was created to 
account for any effect on market performance based on a Silicon Valley zip code. The 
binary variable SILICON_VALLEY was created using Execucomp’s ZIP variable. Zip 
codes that fell into a list of zip codes in the counties regarded as Silicon Valley, 
determined by the Silicon Valley Economic Development Alliance, were assigned a 
value of 1 (Silicon Valley Economic Development Alliance). 
 Market Financial Data 
 Financial performance was measured by market cap growth above NASDAQ 
composite growth over the five year period beginning January 1, 1998 and ending 
December 31, 2002. This five year period comfortably covers the full boom and bust of 
the NASDAQ’s dot-com bubble activity. Market cap data was calculated based on 
security data provided by S&P’s Compustat database. Using the unique GVKEY’s from 
the Execucomp data, monthly security data was drawn for the period. Specifically stock 
price, shares outstanding, and information regarding delisting. The 634 original GVKEY 
firms broke into three groups of data: those who had complete data for the period, those 
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that had different period start and end dates (mostly firms that IPO’d during fiscal year 
1998 and those that later went bust during the bubble), and those that were delisted by the 
SEC due to merger and acquisition activity and other uncommon circumstances. For all 
firms market cap, MKTCAP, was calculated on a per-month-basis by multiplying 
monthly closing price (PRCCM) and outstanding shares (CSHOM) (Wharton Research 
Data Services, 2012).  
NASDAQ composite growth observed the price growth of the NASDAQ 
composite index over the time period. Composite growth data was pulled from 
Compustat’s Index Price database. Monthly prices, PRCCM, were pulled for the entire 
five year period (Standard & Poor's, 2012).  
Complete-data firms made up 461 of the 634 firms. These firms did not require 
any special consideration in regards to market cap extrapolation or special NASDAQ 
composite growth periods. Market cap growth, GRWTH_MKTCAP, was calculated as the 
change in market cap over the complete period over the beginning market cap.  
GRWTH_NAS, was calculated as the NASDAQ composite price growth over the entire 
period. Growth above NASDAQ composite, GRWTH_ABV_NAS, was calculated as the 
difference between GRWTH_MKTCAP and GRWTH_NAS. The use of “above” is used to 
emphasize that positive values indicate growth over NASDAQ growth and negative 
numbers indicate growth below NASDAQ growth. 
The remaining firms were in some way incomplete and adjustments were made to 
the NASDAQ period they were compared to or had market cap extrapolated to cover the 
period. Of the incomplete firms, 63 had alternate periods. This was simply accounted for 
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by calculating the alternate period market growth and comparing it to NASDAQ growth 
over this new period. The remaining 110 firms were delisted throughout this period. 
Using Compustat’s DLRSN variable which codes reasons why the company became 
inactive on the database. Two codes, 01, acquisition or merger, and 10, other (no longer 
files with SEC among other reasons)1, accounted for all 110 reasons for deletion. Of these 
firms only three firms coded as type 10. For these type 10 firms I treated their growth 
data the same as the alternate period firms. The 107 M&A firms represented a theoretical 
challenge. Dropping them from the data set would misrepresent their activity through the 
period, but adopting the growth of their new company would also misrepresent their 
financial performance. With this dilemma in mind I decided to extrapolate the market cap 
of the firm to the end of the period, and then calculated market cap growth over this new 
period. This was then compared to NASDAQ composite growth over this new period to 
calculate GRWTH_ABV_NAS. Since this was a significant assumption to add to 
approximately a quarter of the data, a dummy variable was applied to each M&A firm to 
indicate that it is an extrapolated data point and this dummy is to be used as a control. 
This variable also allows for data cuts that excluded these firms. 
Econometric Methodology 
In analyzing my data I employ three separate econometric models. All three 
models are OLS regressions that have different dependent variables. The first model uses 
GRWTH_ABV_NAS as its dependent variable: 
                                                          
1
 This excludes 10’s from bankruptcy, liquidation, reverse acquisition, LBO’s, and privatization as all of 
those activities have their own unique codes. 
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(1) GWRTH_ABV_NAS = β1tdc + β2tdc_equity_pct + β3salary + 
β4options_ex_per_unex + β5dir + β6comp_comit + β7ma + β8high_tech + 
β9silicon_valley + ε 
This model is applied to all executives and then to a cut of just the top executive at each 
firm. Another cut is then applied to both all and top executives where executives’ firm’s 
with GRWTH_ABV_NAS values above 10 are excluded from the regression in an attempt 
to limit the effect of the outliers on the regression. This model is then modified as I focus 
on the high tech industry. 
(2) GWRTH_ABV_NAS = β1tdc + β2tdc_equity_pct + β3salary + 
β4options_ex_per_unex + β5dir + β6comp_comit + β7ma + β8internet + 
β9silicon_valley + ε 
This model now includes the sub-industry dummy variable INTERNET. All and top 
executive cuts are again applied as well was the outlier exclusion cuts. 
 The next model approaches how compensation affects survival. In this model a 
dummy variable is employed called SURVIVE. A firm is said to survive when its market 
cap growth is greater than or equal to a designated value. In my analysis I regress on a 
range of values designated as survival. This range is based on the distribution of 
GRWTH_ABV_NAS for each unique firm, excluding firms that went through M&A 
activity during the period. M&A firms were excluded from the distribution since they 
were estimated using an extrapolation technique. The range used for SURVIVE is seen in 
Table 2.1 as the first through the 50th percentiles (Table 2.2 incorporates M&A firms). 
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Taking this into consideration the model is as follows for the entire data set and the high 
tech cut: 
(3) SURVIVE = β1tdc + β2tdc_equity_pct + β3salary + β4options_ex_per_unex + 
β5dir + β6comp_comit + β7ma + β8high_tech + β9silicon_valley + ε 
(4) SURVIVE= β1tdc + β2tdc_equity_pct + β3salary + β4options_ex_per_unex + 
β5dir + β6comp_comit + β7ma + β8internet + β9silicon_valley + ε 
Much like the other model I employ all executive and top executive cuts. I also employ 
an outlier exclusion cut of each. The outlier exclusion cuts base their SURVIVE range on 
the distribution of GRWTH_ABV_NAS values under 10 for each unique firm that fits this 
requirement as seen in Table 2.3. 
 The third model uses the binary dependent variable SUCCESS. SUCCESS is 
defined differently than SURVIVE as outperforming the majority of companies through 
the period. Much like SURVIVE, SUCCESS is defined over a range of 
GRWTH_ABV_NAS values from non M&A firms specifically the 75th through the 99th 
percentile on Table 2.1. Thus the model follows for all firms and the high tech cut: 
(5) SUCCESS = β1tdc + β2tdc_equity_pct + β3salary + β4options_ex_per_unex + 
β5dir + β6comp_comit + β7ma + β8high_tech + β9silicon_valley + ε 
(6) SUCCESS= β1tdc + β2tdc_equity_pct + β3salary + β4options_ex_per_unex + 
β5dir + β6comp_comit + β7ma + β8internet + β9silicon_valley + ε 
The same cuts applied to SURVIVE are applied to SUCCESS as well as considerations 
regarding outlier exclusion. Considering the three models three are eighteen groups of 
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regressions that each have a unique take on the effect of compensation schemes on firm 
performance through the dot-com bubble. 
Data Analysis 
Summary Statistics 
 As previously stated the compensation data obtained for this analysis was of 
varying completeness and robustness, but with the applied corrections to the data set the 
final data is reasonably robust for the specific variables evaluated in the econometric 
models. Looking at the summary statistics provides a nice preface and context with which 
to view the regression analysis. GRWTH_ABV_NAS is the underlying dependent variable 
in each regression performed. Tables 2.1 – 2.3 provide detailed summary statistics for 
this variable at varying cuts of sample of 617 unique firms. Looking at the entire sample 
(Table 2.2) there is mean growth over NASDAQ growth of 0.89. However this is highly 
weighted towards the few firms that had astronomical growth in the range of 2000% 
growth above NASDAQ. The median value is at more down to earth level of 0.22 over 
NASDAQ. While this is quite a bit lower than the mean it is still seemingly high. One 
would have guessed that the median value would be closer to zero. However the sample 
of firms in the dataset is substantially lower than the total that trade on the NASDAQ 
exchange since S&P only focuses on S&P 1500 companies. Currently the NASDAQ 
composite is made up of 2774 different companies (NASDAQ). The data shows a 
positive skewness of 5.52 meaning that it has a longer right tail. This is plain to see when 
you compare the maximum value, 28.04, and the minimum value, -0.89, to the median. 
Removing values greater than 10 from the non-M&A firms removed seven observations 
while halving the skewness (see Table 2.3). Other firm specific values give us some 
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insight into our sample. M&A activity occurred in 16.86% of firms during the sample 
period. High tech accounted for 45.55% of the firms and of those firms 8.90% were 
internet ventures. 19.29% of the firms in the sample were headquartered in Silicon 
Valley. 
From an executive compensation standpoint there are five variables that were 
analyzed for this study with 3018 unique executive data points (see Tables 1.1-2). The 
average TDC was $1.832MM, with a staggering range of values from $1 to $655.45MM. 
Of the TDC, equity awards accounted for 38.38% of it on average. In top executives that 
value increased to 42.30%. Exercisable options accounted for an average of 43.64% of 
unexercised options, 47.86% in top executives. 35.79% of all executives in the sample 
were directors, which increased 91.25% in top executives. Compensation committee 
interlocks also increased in top executives from 2.52% to 8.10%. 
Regression Analysis 
In general the regression analysis doesn’t provide very much concrete, undeniable 
insight into the performance of firms through the dot-com bubble other than maybe 
compensation didn’t have much to do with it. Across all variations of the three models, 
regressions in general had very low R2 values, the highest value is 0.129 (see Table 3.2). 
This implies that the variables selected didn’t account for much of the variation in the 
data. While this may be the ultimate take away of this study there is still some significant 
insight to be taken away from my analysis. 
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Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis tested by the models is that of basic principal-agent theory. 
Hypothesis one posits that increasing equity should further align ownership and executive 
incentives which is supposed to be long-term value creation. The models test this using 
the variable TDC_EQUITY_PCT.  Hypothesis one predicts a regression result with 
positive correlation to firm performance, measured as some variant of 
GRWTH_ABV_NAS (by itself or as binary variable SURVIVE and SUCCESS). The first 
model is expressed in Tables 3.1-2. Looking at all data points there is a positive 
coefficient, 0.164.  This is however the only variation of the model that shows positive 
correlation. In top executives, outlier adjusted, and all high-tech data a negative 
correlation is observed. With that in mind, TDC_EQUITY_PCT showed no statistical 
significance across any iteration of the first model. 
The second model, observed in Tables 4.1-8, shows statistical significance in 
certain iterations, and displays primarily negative coefficients. Tables 4.1-2 display 
regression results for SURVIVE at the first through 50th percentiles. TDC_EQUITY_PCT 
has statistically significant negative correlations to survival at the first, fifth, and tenth 
percentiles. This result holds when adjusted for outliers. In other words, when survival is 
defined as outperforming the bottom 1, 5, and 10%, increasing equity as a percent of total 
pay actually decreases the probability of survival. The significance of these results is 
essentially lost in the HIGH_TECH cuts displayed in Tables 4.5-6. This result is fairly 
interesting. Essentially the effect of equity as a percent of total pay on firm survival was 
null when examining the HIGH_TECH firms that were at the epicenter of the bubble. In 
top executives, Tables 4.2-3, we see statistically significant correlation in the 5th and 10th 
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percentiles. This result holds when adjusted for outliers. Like the all executives cut, when 
focused on high tech TDC_EQUITY_PCT loses its statistical significance (Tables 4.7-8). 
The third model shows less consistency in its results. In the all executive, outlier 
adjusted cut (Table 5.2) statistical significance is weakly shown at the 95th percentile with 
a positive coefficient and solidly at the 99th percentile with a negative coefficient. These 
results seemingly contradict each other (unless TDC_EQUITY_PCT is distributed like a 
negative quadratic between the 95th and 99th percentile) and along with very weak R2 
values essentially conclude that TDC_EQUITY_PCT doesn’t affect success in the dataset. 
The high tech cut for all executives (Table 5.5) shows statistically significant correlation 
at the 95th percentile. 
Theses overall results are unsurprising for hypothesis one since it doesn’t 
incorporate the unique circumstance of a speculative bubble. This simplicity probably 
accounts for the predominantly negative correlations across the different regressions. 
Equity by itself without provisions that account for the task problem the manager faces 
encourages short-term speculative decisions that hurt long term growth. The weakness of 
the regressions strongly imply that TDC_EQUITY_PCT doesn’t have a significant effect 
on long term growth, again not surprising given the simplicity of the theory in regards to 
a speculative bubble. 
 Hypothesis 2 
 The second hypothesis, incorporating the theory of Bolton et al. (2006), focuses 
on the regression results of OPTIONS_EX_PER_UNEX (called OPTIONS from now on). 
The hypothesis predicts negative correlation between OPTIONS and the various growth 
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metrics of the models. Lower values of OPTIONS imply that option grants have longer 
vesting periods. The first model finds consistent negative correlation between OPTIONS 
and  GRWTH_ABV_NAS. In the all firm cut OPTIONS is statistically significant to 1% 
for all executives with a -0.449 coefficient. This is a strong statement for this specific cut 
since we are looking a growth rate. A 1% increase in OPTIONS will account for a 0.45% 
decrease in growth (since both variables are percents already). This holds for high tech 
firms as well with even more negative coefficients and statistical significance across all 
cuts. The coefficients become more negative as the data moves from all executives to top 
executives. This result supports long-term focused option plans for top executives.  
 The results are much less supportive in the SURVIVE model. OPTIONS finds its 
only statistical significance in the SURVIVE model at the 50th percentile in the high tech 
top executive cut. This goes with the results so far, but it is only significant at 10% so it 
should be interpreted with some hesitation. The rest of the SURVIVE results don’t show 
any consistent coefficient pattern positive or negative.  
 SUCCESS shows statistically significant negative coefficients on the lower end of 
the percentile range across most of the regression cuts. OPTIONS variables show at least 
10% significance and negative correlation to SUCCESS in 14 out of the 32 regressions 
that employ the SUCCESS model. For the most part these results are distributed between 
the 75th and 90th percentile. Significance is surprisingly absent from the all firms top 
executives cut (Table 5.3), its outlier adjusted form, and the outlier adjusted cut of the 
high tech top executives. This seems somewhat surprising since the top executives 
theoretically have the most influence of any executive in the stock price performance of a 
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firm. The outlier adjusted models may sell the SUCCESS model short since they 
disregard the real homerun firms which may explain why OPTIONS loses significance 
when it moves from high tech top executives to the outlier adjusted cut. The magnitude of 
the coefficients increase when moving from all firms to high tech firms. For example at 
the 75th percentile for all executives, the coefficient goes from -0.0724 to -0.147 and a 
jump from statistical significance at the 5% level to the 1% level (Tables 5.1 and 5.5). 
 The regression results for OPTIONS suggest some validity to hypothesis 2, but 
low R2 values would require further testing and a more comprehensive data set to 
comfortably prove hypothesis 2. The lack of results in the SURVIVE model don’t surprise 
me. Of all of the performance variables SURVIVE is the least worried about high 
performance, unlike SUCCESS or the more fluid GRWTH_ABV_NAS. Instead SURVIVE 
is much more interested in minimum-level passing performance. The results are really 
encouraging for the high tech cuts. With the increase in negativity going from all firms to 
high tech firms, the idea that long-term focus is rewarded in a speculative bubble is 
further enforced as high tech was the epicenter of the speculation. 
Hypothesis 3 
 The third hypothesis concerns Bertrand and Mullainathan’s skimming theory 
(2001) which was tested using the DIR and COMP_COMIT variables. The first model 
delivers some very interesting results for DIR and doesn’t conclude much of anything for 
COMP_COMIT. Specifically, DIR has a statistically significant positive coefficient for 
all executives and a statistically significant negative coefficient for top executives. This 
holds especially true when moving from all firms to high tech firms with greater degrees 
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of each and increased statistical significance to the 1% level. What this implies is that 
giving lesser executives board seats stimulates growth, but top executives negate it. 
COMP_COMIT has no statistically significant coefficients, but this may be unsurprising 
since it had such a low incidence in the data set. 
 The SURVIVE model slightly supports the findings of the first model, as DIR is 
statistically significantly positive in the all executive cuts, while it shows no significance 
in the top executive cuts. In the all executive all firm cut, DIR is significant to the 5% 
level in the 5th through the 50th percentiles (Table 4.1) with positive correlation, and in 
the resulting top executive cut it has no significance (Table 4.3). However, DIR shows no 
other significance throughout the remaining SURVIVE tests. COMP_COMIT shows no 
statistical significance through the SURVIVE model testing. 
 The SUCCESS model further supports the findings of the first two models. 
Supporting the findings of model 1 even more so than model two did, DIR  is statistically 
significantly positive in the all executive cuts for all firms and high tech firms (Tables 5.1 
and 5.5), while being statistically significantly negative for (Tables 5.3 and 5.7). The 
coefficients also increase in degree as the data moves from all firms to high tech firms as 
evidenced by the 99th percentile jump from 0.00940 to 0.0192 for all executives, and        
-0.0985 and-0.133 in top executives. COMP_COMIT was never significant. 
 The data suggests that there is a benefit to having executives on the board but in a 
somewhat surprising turn this neither confirms nor denies the hypothesis since it suggest 
some but not all executive involvement on the board, but even better it suggests a new 
hypothesis. These results suggest a “my leader’s keeper” policy in regards to executive 
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involvement on the board: where low ranking executives have board seats and no the 
CEO.  With no further data I would venture to guess that this has something to do with 
the how fast CEO turnover is and that their board involvemen could complicate decision 
making if things go sour between the owners and the CEO. There is also probably an ego 
difference between the top executive and the executive team, and thus director 
involvement would favor the level-headed team members over the egotistical CEO. As 
with all the other results in the analysis R2 levels are far too low to make any sweeping 
claims and thus further testing with more comprehensive data is required to say anything 
more. 
Conclusion 
 The goal of this paper study was to examine the effects of executive 
compensation on the performance of firm through the dot-com bubble and test the 
hypotheses set forth. In this regard the paper has been successful. The conclusiveness of 
the results however is up for discussion. While there were indeed significant pieces of 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that longer vesting periods supported higher growth 
through the dot-com bubble, the regressions’ R2 values indicate that there is much more 
work to be done statistically to show it conclusively. The most exciting part of this 
research is the new questions that it has proposed. Can these findings be replicated across 
other speculative bubbles? Such as the most recent, and the stock market crash that 
instigated the Great Depression. What about the “my leader’s keeper” theory of 
understanding the director results? Executive tenure could affect this theory. The only 
way to know is to continue this research further. 
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Appendix of Tables and Figures 
Table 1.1 – Summary statistics of the regressed variables, all executives 
VARIABLE Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
grwth_abv_nas 3018 0.8006465 2.450846 -1.512043 28.04014 
tdc 3018 1832.938 14125.06 0.001 655448 
tdc_equity_pct 3018 0.3838176 0.3095416 0 1 
salary 3018 259.6355 151.0023 0 1610.367 
options_ex_per_unex 2649 0.4364145 0.2925168 0 1 
dir 3018 0.3578529 0.479448 0 1 
comp_comit 3018 0.0251822 0.1567043 0 1 
ma 3018 0.1799205 0.3841849 0 1 
high_tech 3018 0.4406892 0.496552 0 1 
internet 3018 0.0377734 0.1906793 0 1 
internet* 1330 0.0857143 0.280047 0 1 
silicon_valley 3018 0.1855533 0.3888102 0 1 
*summary statistics when high_tech cut is applied 
Table 1.2 – Summary statistics of the regressed variables, top executives 
VARIABLE Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
grwth_abv_nas 617 0.8896955 2.611759 -1.512043 28.04014 
tdc 617 3870.951 27549.27 0.001 655448 
tdc_equity_pct 617 0.423011 0.3299442 0 0.9946555 
salary 617 386.8604 205.7131 0.001 1610.367 
options_ex_per_unex 544 0.4786189 0.289184 0 1 
dir 617 0.9124797 0.2828252 0 1 
comp_comit 617 0.0810373 0.2731138 0 1 
ma 617 0.1685575 0.3746644 0 1 
high_tech 617 0.4554295 0.4984136 0 1 
internet 617 0.0405186 0.1973322 0 1 
internet* 281 0.088968 0.2852054 0 1 
silicon_valley 617 0.1928687 0.394871 0 1 
*summary statistics when high_tech cut is applied 
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Table 2.1: Market Cap growth above NASDAQ Composite growth, no M&A firms 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% -0.7122293 -0.8862209   
5% -0.651648 -0.7147648   
10% -0.5408731 -0.714734 Obs 513 
25% -0.2812632 -0.7132097 Sum of Wgt. 513 
 
 
   
50% 0.3149487  Mean 0.9192003 
 
 
Largest Std. Dev. 2.407799 
75% 1.089184 12.94464   
90% 2.907125 15.27972 Variance 5.797498 
95% 4.358445 18.77463 Skewness 5.242266 
99% 10.90404 28.04014 Kurtosis 44.54698 
 
Table 2.2 – Market Cap growth above NASDAQ Composite growth, all firms 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% -0.7132097 -1.512043   
5% -0.6526207 -0.8862209   
10% -0.5376322 -0.7147648 Obs 617 
25% -0.2812632 -0.714734 Sum of Wgt. 617 
 
 
   
50% 0.2160695  Mean 0.8896955 
 
 
Largest Std. Dev. 2.611759 
75% 1.007116 18.77463   
90% 2.810526 22.76616 Variance 6.821286 
95% 4.358445 23.55993 Skewness 5.526877 
99% 10.94141 28.04014 Kurtosis 44.39061 
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Table 2.3 – Market cap growth above NASDAQ, values greater than 10 removed from 
sample, no M&A firms 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% -0.7122293 -0.8862209   
5% -0.651648 -0.7147648   
10% -0.5453479 -0.714734 Obs 506 
25% -0.287317 -0.7132097 Sum of Wgt. 506 
 
 
   
50% 0.2993261  Mean 0.7202983 
 
 
Largest Std. Dev. 1.57765 
75% 1.04208 7.721298   
90% 2.538953 9.185977 Variance 2.488981 
95% 3.919 9.502603 Skewness 2.545489 
99% 6.750967 9.970954 Kurtosis 11.29882 
 
Table 3.1 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on market cap growth 
over NASDAQ for all firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   All Execs Top Execs 
VARIABLES All Execs Top Execs outliers removed outliers removed 
     
tdc -5.73e-07 2.90e-07 -6.64e-07 -1.53e-08 
 (3.35e-06) (4.01e-06) (1.92e-06) (2.25e-06) 
tdc_equity_pct 0.164 -0.112 -0.0540 -0.164 
 (0.177) (0.384) (0.102) (0.216) 
salary -0.000697* -0.000930 -0.000960*** -0.00121*** 
 (0.000368) (0.000595) (0.000213) (0.000337) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.449** -0.329 -0.132 -0.0582 
 (0.175) (0.407) (0.101) (0.230) 
dir 0.255** -1.843*** 0.136** 0.258 
 (0.115) (0.542) (0.0664) (0.320) 
comp_comit -0.180 -0.194 0.104 -0.0310 
 (0.329) (0.440) (0.188) (0.247) 
ma -0.439*** -0.191 -0.566*** -0.497*** 
 (0.125) (0.298) (0.0717) (0.169) 
high_tech -0.0394 -0.141 -0.0600 -0.155 
 (0.107) (0.256) (0.0615) (0.144) 
silicon_valley 0.150 0.0731 0.275*** 0.269 
 (0.135) (0.309) (0.0774) (0.174) 
Constant 1.107*** 3.316*** 0.966*** 1.084*** 
 (0.156) (0.604) (0.0900) (0.352) 
     
Observations 2649 544 2617 536 
R-squared 0.010 0.037 0.034 0.044 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.2 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on market cap growth 
over NASDAQ for high tech firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   All Execs Top Execs 
VARIABLES All Execs Top Execs outliers removed outliers removed 
     
tdc 1.28e-06 1.30e-06 -1.40e-07 5.64e-07 
 (3.41e-06) (4.19e-06) (2.01e-06) (2.41e-06) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.236 -0.121 -0.0748 -0.159 
 (0.249) (0.554) (0.147) (0.320) 
salary -0.00237*** -0.00156 -0.00113*** -0.00125** 
 (0.000609) (0.00106) (0.000361) (0.000612) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.552** -1.182* -0.419** -0.798** 
 (0.279) (0.650) (0.165) (0.376) 
dir 0.468*** -2.553*** 0.160 0.232 
 (0.171) (0.653) (0.102) (0.402) 
comp_comit 0.0366 0.320 0.404 0.316 
 (0.556) (0.720) (0.327) (0.414) 
ma -0.0355 0.637 -0.472*** -0.251 
 (0.194) (0.473) (0.115) (0.277) 
internet 1.036*** 0.433 0.188 -0.207 
 (0.298) (0.769) (0.180) (0.455) 
silicon_valley 0.148 0.00389 0.197** 0.236 
 (0.156) (0.366) (0.0926) (0.213) 
Constant 1.495*** 4.260*** 1.058*** 1.270*** 
 (0.234) (0.753) (0.139) (0.456) 
     
Observations 1171 244 1156 240 
R-squared 0.033 0.129 0.031 0.048 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.1 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SURVIVE variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for all executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 
      
tdc 5.26e-08 2.60e-07 5.18e-07 -8.49e-07 -9.55e-07* 
 (1.93e-07) (3.20e-07) (4.14e-07) (5.87e-07) (5.63e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0271*** -0.0309* -0.0746*** -0.0116 -0.0325 
 (0.0102) (0.0170) (0.0220) (0.0311) (0.0299) 
salary -5.92e-05*** -0.000205*** -0.000235*** -0.000254*** -0.000208*** 
 (2.12e-05) (3.52e-05) (4.55e-05) (6.45e-05) (6.19e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.00319 -0.00170 0.00148 0.00653 -0.00549 
 (0.0101) (0.0168) (0.0217) (0.0308) (0.0295) 
dir 0.00529 0.0252** 0.0291** 0.0547*** 0.0489** 
 (0.00664) (0.0110) (0.0142) (0.0202) (0.0194) 
comp_comit 0.0255 0.0205 -0.0144 -0.0329 0.000144 
 (0.0190) (0.0315) (0.0407) (0.0577) (0.0553) 
ma -0.0186*** -0.0222* 0.0120 -0.0931*** -0.0282 
 (0.00719) (0.0119) (0.0154) (0.0218) (0.0210) 
high_tech 0.0219*** 0.0403*** 0.0401*** -0.0599*** -0.0542*** 
 (0.00617) (0.0102) (0.0132) (0.0187) (0.0180) 
silicon_valley 0.00954 0.0446*** 0.0426** 0.171*** 0.143*** 
 (0.00778) (0.0129) (0.0167) (0.0236) (0.0227) 
Constant 0.997*** 0.974*** 0.946*** 0.794*** 0.823*** 
 (0.00902) (0.0149) (0.0193) (0.0274) (0.0263) 
      
Observations 2649 2649 2649 2649 2649 
R-squared 0.016 0.032 0.024 0.032 0.022 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.2 - Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SURVIVE variable evaluated at varying percentiles of 
market cap growth over NASDAQ for all executives, outliers (grwth_abv_nas > 10) removed  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 
      
tdc 5.39e-08 2.63e-07 3.87e-07 -8.50e-07 -2.66e-07 
 (1.95e-07) (3.22e-07) (4.01e-07) (5.76e-07) (6.47e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0280*** -0.0330* -0.0630*** -0.0309 -0.00203 
 (0.0104) (0.0172) (0.0214) (0.0307) (0.0345) 
salary -6.13e-05*** -0.000211*** -0.000197*** -0.000246*** -0.000237*** 
 (2.16e-05) (3.58e-05) (4.46e-05) (6.40e-05) (7.20e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.00251 5.54e-06 0.00273 -0.00754 -0.0249 
 (0.0103) (0.0170) (0.0211) (0.0303) (0.0341) 
dir 0.00537 0.0255** 0.0207 0.0469** 0.0359 
 (0.00675) (0.0112) (0.0139) (0.0200) (0.0224) 
comp_comit 0.0259 0.0216 -0.00486 0.00396 0.00398 
 (0.0191) (0.0317) (0.0394) (0.0566) (0.0636) 
ma -0.0186** -0.0217* 0.00258 -0.0144 -0.274*** 
 (0.00728) (0.0121) (0.0150) (0.0215) (0.0242) 
high_tech 0.0223*** 0.0413*** 0.0518*** -0.0630*** -0.0308 
 (0.00624) (0.0103) (0.0129) (0.0185) (0.0208) 
silicon_valley 0.00984 0.0455*** 0.0258 0.151*** 0.191*** 
 (0.00787) (0.0130) (0.0162) (0.0233) (0.0262) 
Constant 0.997*** 0.974*** 0.941*** 0.818*** 0.549*** 
 (0.00914) (0.0151) (0.0188) (0.0270) (0.0304) 
      
Observations 2617 2617 2617 2617 2617 
R-squared 0.016 0.033 0.021 0.024 0.066 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.3 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SURVIVE variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for top executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 
      
tdc 6.20e-08 2.97e-07 4.77e-07 -6.26e-07 -6.55e-07 
 (2.15e-07) (3.50e-07) (4.58e-07) (6.60e-07) (6.30e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0335 -0.0792** -0.102** -0.0192 -0.0667 
 (0.0206) (0.0335) (0.0438) (0.0631) (0.0603) 
salary -3.40e-05 -0.000163*** -0.000237*** -0.000219** -0.000176* 
 (3.20e-05) (5.20e-05) (6.79e-05) (9.79e-05) (9.35e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex 5.50e-06 0.000221 0.00518 -0.00158 -0.0626 
 (0.0219) (0.0355) (0.0464) (0.0670) (0.0639) 
dir -0.0131 0.0185 -0.0203 0.0638 0.0939 
 (0.0291) (0.0473) (0.0619) (0.0892) (0.0852) 
comp_comit 0.0218 -0.0246 -0.118** -0.112 -0.0959 
 (0.0236) (0.0384) (0.0502) (0.0724) (0.0691) 
ma -0.0121 -0.00798 0.0229 -0.0652 0.00106 
 (0.0160) (0.0260) (0.0339) (0.0490) (0.0467) 
high_tech 0.0195 0.0344 0.0250 -0.0735* -0.0608 
 (0.0137) (0.0223) (0.0292) (0.0420) (0.0401) 
silicon_valley 0.00855 0.0319 0.0110 0.136*** 0.109** 
 (0.0166) (0.0270) (0.0353) (0.0508) (0.0485) 
Constant 1.012*** 1.009*** 1.046*** 0.812*** 0.838*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0527) (0.0689) (0.0994) (0.0949) 
      
Observations 544 544 544 544 544 
R-squared 0.017 0.043 0.048 0.034 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.4 - Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SURVIVE variable evaluated at varying percentiles of 
market cap growth over NASDAQ for top executives, outliers (grwth_abv_nas > 10) removed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 
      
tdc 6.18e-08 2.97e-07 4.13e-07 -5.88e-07 -9.14e-08 
 (2.17e-07) (3.53e-07) (4.47e-07) (6.46e-07) (7.43e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0337 -0.0800** -0.111** -0.0578 -0.00379 
 (0.0208) (0.0338) (0.0428) (0.0619) (0.0712) 
salary -3.46e-05 -0.000166*** -0.000205*** -0.000214** -0.000329*** 
 (3.25e-05) (5.28e-05) (6.70e-05) (9.67e-05) (0.000111) 
options_ex_per_unex 0.000374 0.000757 0.0101 -0.0429 -0.0490 
 (0.0222) (0.0360) (0.0457) (0.0660) (0.0760) 
dir -0.0129 0.0227 -0.0193 0.112 0.136 
 (0.0309) (0.0502) (0.0636) (0.0919) (0.106) 
comp_comit 0.0221 -0.0239 -0.0972** -0.0789 -0.0667 
 (0.0238) (0.0387) (0.0491) (0.0709) (0.0815) 
ma -0.0118 -0.00784 0.0173 0.0119 -0.273*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0264) (0.0335) (0.0484) (0.0557) 
high_tech 0.0199 0.0348 0.0354 -0.0759* -0.0570 
 (0.0139) (0.0226) (0.0286) (0.0414) (0.0476) 
silicon_valley 0.00876 0.0328 0.00368 0.120** 0.157*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0273) (0.0346) (0.0500) (0.0576) 
Constant 1.011*** 1.005*** 1.037*** 0.807*** 0.546*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0552) (0.0700) (0.101) (0.116) 
      
Observations 536 536 536 536 536 
R-squared 0.017 0.043 0.043 0.032 0.071 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.5 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SURVIVE variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDQ for all executives, HIGH_TECH cut 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 
      
tdc 5.93e-09 2.45e-07 5.93e-07 -8.26e-07 -1.06e-06* 
 (1.27e-07) (2.39e-07) (3.74e-07) (6.03e-07) (5.81e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0175* 0.0273 -0.0176 0.0233 0.0221 
 (0.00926) (0.0174) (0.0273) (0.0439) (0.0424) 
salary -1.45e-05 -0.000246*** -0.000300*** -0.000279*** -0.000180* 
 (2.27e-05) (4.26e-05) (6.68e-05) (0.000108) (0.000104) 
options_ex_per_unex 0.0135 0.0152 0.0228 -0.0886* -0.0542 
 (0.0104) (0.0195) (0.0305) (0.0492) (0.0474) 
dir 0.00434 0.0175 0.00712 0.0407 0.0385 
 (0.00638) (0.0120) (0.0188) (0.0303) (0.0292) 
comp_comit 0.000108 0.0218 0.0458 0.0153 0.0277 
 (0.0207) (0.0388) (0.0609) (0.0981) (0.0946) 
ma -0.0190*** -0.0355*** 0.0167 -0.0271 0.0300 
 (0.00724) (0.0136) (0.0213) (0.0343) (0.0331) 
internet 0.0181 -0.0470** -0.0200 0.0240 0.0676 
 (0.0111) (0.0208) (0.0326) (0.0526) (0.0507) 
silicon_valley -0.00199 0.0209* 0.0640*** 0.205*** 0.178*** 
 (0.00583) (0.0109) (0.0171) (0.0276) (0.0267) 
Constant 1.000*** 1.005*** 0.964*** 0.740*** 0.731*** 
 (0.00872) (0.0164) (0.0257) (0.0413) (0.0399) 
      
Observations 1171 1171 1171 1171 1171 
R-squared 0.016 0.041 0.031 0.059 0.053 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.6 - Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SURVIVE variable evaluated at varying percentiles of 
market cap growth over NASDAQ for all executives, outliers (grwth_abv_nas > 10) removed, HIGH_TECH cut 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 
      
tdc 5.81e-09 2.44e-07 3.89e-07 -9.20e-07 -4.28e-07 
 (1.28e-07) (2.40e-07) (3.50e-07) (5.95e-07) (6.77e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0178* 0.0279 0.0176 0.0191 0.0730 
 (0.00939) (0.0176) (0.0257) (0.0437) (0.0497) 
salary -1.43e-05 -0.000246*** -0.000216*** -0.000226** -0.000151 
 (2.30e-05) (4.31e-05) (6.29e-05) (0.000107) (0.000122) 
options_ex_per_unex 0.0140 0.0161 0.0358 -0.0644 -0.0613 
 (0.0105) (0.0197) (0.0288) (0.0489) (0.0557) 
dir 0.00444 0.0173 -0.0111 0.0285 0.0100 
 (0.00649) (0.0122) (0.0177) (0.0302) (0.0343) 
comp_comit -2.35e-05 0.0222 0.0366 0.0588 0.153 
 (0.0208) (0.0391) (0.0570) (0.0969) (0.110) 
ma -0.0195*** -0.0367*** 0.00446 0.0442 -0.209*** 
 (0.00736) (0.0138) (0.0201) (0.0342) (0.0390) 
internet 0.0181 -0.0513** -0.0275 0.0662 0.0917 
 (0.0114) (0.0215) (0.0313) (0.0532) (0.0606) 
silicon_valley -0.00198 0.0210* 0.0400** 0.185*** 0.166*** 
 (0.00590) (0.0111) (0.0161) (0.0274) (0.0312) 
Constant 1.000*** 1.004*** 0.950*** 0.727*** 0.472*** 
 (0.00883) (0.0166) (0.0242) (0.0411) (0.0468) 
      
Observations 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156 
R-squared 0.016 0.041 0.020 0.057 0.052 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.7 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SURVIVE variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for top executives, HIGH_TECH cut 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 
      
tdc 2.75e-08 2.35e-07 5.23e-07 -6.11e-07 -7.33e-07 
 (1.45e-07) (2.64e-07) (4.24e-07) (6.91e-07) (6.65e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.00171 0.0233 0.00415 0.0588 0.0297 
 (0.0192) (0.0349) (0.0561) (0.0915) (0.0880) 
salary -1.81e-05 -0.000193*** -0.000297*** -0.000239 -0.000114 
 (3.67e-05) (6.67e-05) (0.000107) (0.000175) (0.000168) 
options_ex_per_unex 0.0214 -0.0139 -0.0160 -0.113 -0.182* 
 (0.0225) (0.0409) (0.0658) (0.107) (0.103) 
dir -0.00957 -0.00490 -0.0428 0.0651 0.0876 
 (0.0226) (0.0412) (0.0662) (0.108) (0.104) 
comp_comit 0.00308 0.0325 0.0254 -0.0182 0.0264 
 (0.0249) (0.0453) (0.0729) (0.119) (0.114) 
ma -0.0189 -0.0186 0.0375 0.0229 0.0726 
 (0.0164) (0.0298) (0.0479) (0.0780) (0.0750) 
internet 0.0151 -0.0674 -0.0585 -0.0848 -0.0440 
 (0.0266) (0.0484) (0.0778) (0.127) (0.122) 
silicon_valley -0.00436 0.0106 0.0272 0.165*** 0.143** 
 (0.0127) (0.0231) (0.0371) (0.0605) (0.0582) 
Constant 1.001*** 1.035*** 1.049*** 0.727*** 0.736*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0474) (0.0762) (0.124) (0.119) 
      
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 
R-squared 0.014 0.049 0.046 0.059 0.060 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.8 - Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SURVIVE variable evaluated at varying percentiles of 
market cap growth over NASDAQ for top executives, outliers (grwth_abv_nas > 10) removed, HIGH_TECH cut 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 1st 5th 10th 25th 50th 
      
tdc 2.65e-08 2.37e-07 3.68e-07 -6.48e-07 -2.94e-08 
 (1.46e-07) (2.66e-07) (4.10e-07) (6.85e-07) (7.91e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.00156 0.0238 0.0234 0.0362 0.0244 
 (0.0194) (0.0353) (0.0544) (0.0909) (0.105) 
salary -1.78e-05 -0.000195*** -0.000222** -0.000184 -0.000304 
 (3.71e-05) (6.75e-05) (0.000104) (0.000174) (0.000201) 
options_ex_per_unex 0.0219 -0.0151 0.0220 -0.132 -0.135 
 (0.0228) (0.0415) (0.0640) (0.107) (0.123) 
dir -0.00811 -0.00266 -0.0544 0.103 0.118 
 (0.0244) (0.0444) (0.0684) (0.114) (0.132) 
comp_comit 0.00298 0.0327 0.0112 0.0453 0.0797 
 (0.0252) (0.0457) (0.0704) (0.118) (0.136) 
ma -0.0195 -0.0201 0.0317 0.0884 -0.169* 
 (0.0168) (0.0306) (0.0471) (0.0787) (0.0910) 
internet 0.0158 -0.0729 -0.0538 -0.0581 -0.0179 
 (0.0276) (0.0502) (0.0773) (0.129) (0.149) 
silicon_valley -0.00450 0.0111 0.0117 0.153** 0.149** 
 (0.0129) (0.0235) (0.0361) (0.0604) (0.0698) 
Constant 0.999*** 1.034*** 1.023*** 0.691*** 0.499*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0503) (0.0775) (0.130) (0.150) 
      
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 
R-squared 0.014 0.050 0.029 0.060 0.047 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.1 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SUCCESS variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for all executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 75th 90th 95th 99th 
     
tdc -6.54e-08 -3.66e-08 2.31e-08 2.79e-08 
 (5.55e-07) (3.76e-07) (2.72e-07) (1.42e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0137 0.0280 -0.00565 0.00657 
 (0.0294) (0.0199) (0.0144) (0.00752) 
salary -0.000231*** -0.000131*** -6.38e-05** -1.53e-05 
 (6.10e-05) (4.12e-05) (2.98e-05) (1.56e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.0724** -0.0336* -0.0264* -0.0159** 
 (0.0291) (0.0197) (0.0142) (0.00743) 
dir 0.0473** 0.0297** 0.0130 0.00940* 
 (0.0191) (0.0129) (0.00934) (0.00487) 
comp_comit 0.0464 0.0183 -0.0141 -0.0150 
 (0.0546) (0.0369) (0.0267) (0.0139) 
ma -0.155*** -0.0647*** -0.0207** 0.00245 
 (0.0207) (0.0140) (0.0101) (0.00527) 
high_tech -0.0374** -0.0266** 0.00284 0.00278 
 (0.0177) (0.0120) (0.00867) (0.00452) 
silicon_valley 0.139*** 0.0124 -0.0161 -0.00668 
 (0.0224) (0.0151) (0.0109) (0.00571) 
Constant 0.333*** 0.135*** 0.0753*** 0.0159** 
 (0.0259) (0.0175) (0.0127) (0.00662) 
     
Observations 2649 2649 2649 2649 
R-squared 0.039 0.014 0.006 0.005 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.2 - Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SUCCESS variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for all executives, outliers (grwth_abv_nas > 10) removed  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 75th 90th 95th 99th 
     
tdc 3.12e-08 -1.30e-08 -2.21e-08 3.65e-08 
 (5.58e-07) (3.90e-07) (2.74e-07) (1.30e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0188 0.0160 0.0269* -0.0153** 
 (0.0297) (0.0208) (0.0146) (0.00695) 
salary -0.000207*** -0.000163*** -9.45e-05*** -3.09e-05** 
 (6.21e-05) (4.34e-05) (3.05e-05) (1.45e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.0585** -0.0110 0.000138 -0.00596 
 (0.0294) (0.0206) (0.0144) (0.00687) 
dir 0.0315 0.0201 0.00709 0.00346 
 (0.0193) (0.0135) (0.00949) (0.00452) 
comp_comit 0.0506 0.0335 0.00183 -0.00903 
 (0.0548) (0.0383) (0.0269) (0.0128) 
ma -0.161*** -0.0661*** -0.0393*** -0.00781 
 (0.0209) (0.0146) (0.0102) (0.00488) 
high_tech -0.0335* -0.0250** -0.00150 -0.00129 
 (0.0179) (0.0125) (0.00879) (0.00418) 
silicon_valley 0.151*** 0.0170 -0.0293*** 0.00616 
 (0.0226) (0.0158) (0.0111) (0.00527) 
Constant 0.328*** 0.148*** 0.0688*** 0.0268*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0183) (0.0129) (0.00613) 
     
Observations 2617 2617 2617 2617 
R-squared 0.041 0.014 0.012 0.005 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.3 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SUCCESS variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for top executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 75th 90th 95th 99th 
     
tdc 8.53e-08 4.08e-08 7.52e-08 2.96e-08 
 (6.40e-07) (4.48e-07) (3.26e-07) (1.70e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0427 0.0199 -0.0153 0.00135 
 (0.0612) (0.0429) (0.0311) (0.0163) 
salary -0.000325*** -0.000167** -8.09e-05* -6.29e-06 
 (9.50e-05) (6.65e-05) (4.83e-05) (2.52e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.00870 0.00271 -0.0426 -0.0178 
 (0.0649) (0.0455) (0.0330) (0.0172) 
dir 0.0845 -0.0708 -0.0836* -0.0985*** 
 (0.0865) (0.0606) (0.0440) (0.0230) 
comp_comit 0.0444 0.0316 -0.0252 -0.00978 
 (0.0702) (0.0492) (0.0357) (0.0186) 
ma -0.141*** -0.0590* -0.00764 0.0110 
 (0.0475) (0.0332) (0.0241) (0.0126) 
high_tech -0.0635 -0.0449 -0.00563 0.00284 
 (0.0408) (0.0286) (0.0207) (0.0108) 
silicon_valley 0.132*** 0.00578 -0.0199 -0.0132 
 (0.0493) (0.0345) (0.0251) (0.0131) 
Constant 0.336*** 0.246*** 0.197*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0964) (0.0675) (0.0490) (0.0256) 
     
Observations 544 544 544 544 
R-squared 0.050 0.025 0.023 0.045 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.4 - Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SUCCESS variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for top executives, outliers (grwth_abv_nas > 10) removed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 75th 90th 95th 99th 
     
tdc 8.17e-08 6.98e-08 1.25e-08 5.29e-08 
 (6.38e-07) (4.54e-07) (3.23e-07) (1.61e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0432 -0.00643 0.0140 -0.0198 
 (0.0611) (0.0435) (0.0310) (0.0155) 
salary -0.000304*** -0.000208*** -0.000113** -3.77e-05 
 (9.55e-05) (6.81e-05) (4.84e-05) (2.42e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex 0.00919 0.0308 0.00244 -0.0131 
 (0.0652) (0.0465) (0.0330) (0.0165) 
dir 0.195** 0.0436 0.0258 -0.0221 
 (0.0907) (0.0647) (0.0460) (0.0229) 
comp_comit 0.0432 0.0489 -0.00433 -0.0118 
 (0.0700) (0.0499) (0.0354) (0.0177) 
ma -0.153*** -0.0635* -0.0341 -0.000639 
 (0.0478) (0.0341) (0.0242) (0.0121) 
high_tech -0.0548 -0.0474 -0.00790 -0.00351 
 (0.0408) (0.0291) (0.0207) (0.0103) 
silicon_valley 0.151*** 0.0242 -0.0261 0.00954 
 (0.0494) (0.0352) (0.0250) (0.0125) 
Constant 0.208** 0.153** 0.0745 0.0637** 
 (0.0999) (0.0712) (0.0506) (0.0253) 
     
Observations 536 536 536 536 
R-squared 0.056 0.028 0.016 0.014 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.5 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SUCCESS variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for all executives, HIGH_TECH cut 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 75th 90th 95th 99th 
     
tdc 3.25e-08 2.69e-07 1.79e-07 9.89e-08 
 (5.76e-07) (3.70e-07) (2.80e-07) (1.54e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0227 -0.0385 -0.0482** -0.0136 
 (0.0420) (0.0270) (0.0204) (0.0112) 
salary -0.000311*** -0.000278*** -0.000149*** -8.05e-05*** 
 (0.000103) (6.60e-05) (5.00e-05) (2.76e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.147*** -0.0760** -0.0430* -0.00958 
 (0.0470) (0.0302) (0.0229) (0.0126) 
dir 0.0738** 0.0570*** 0.0300** 0.0192** 
 (0.0289) (0.0186) (0.0141) (0.00775) 
comp_comit 0.0240 0.0416 0.0328 -0.0234 
 (0.0938) (0.0602) (0.0456) (0.0251) 
ma -0.153*** -0.0167 -0.00435 0.0140 
 (0.0328) (0.0211) (0.0160) (0.00879) 
internet 0.179*** -0.0323 0.0116 0.0417*** 
 (0.0503) (0.0323) (0.0245) (0.0135) 
silicon_valley 0.120*** 0.00674 -0.0336*** -0.00299 
 (0.0264) (0.0170) (0.0128) (0.00707) 
Constant 0.335*** 0.180*** 0.122*** 0.0326*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0254) (0.0192) (0.0106) 
     
Observations 1171 1171 1171 1171 
R-squared 0.052 0.025 0.027 0.028 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.6 - Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SUCCESS variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for all executives, outliers (grwth_abv_nas > 10) removed, HIGH_TECH cut  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 75th 90th 95th 99th 
     
tdc 2.85e-08 8.29e-08 9.45e-08 8.24e-08 
 (5.82e-07) (3.89e-07) (2.76e-07) (1.35e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct 0.0127 -0.0105 -0.00774 -0.0150 
 (0.0427) (0.0285) (0.0203) (0.00988) 
salary -0.000225** -0.000197*** -0.000135*** -5.90e-05** 
 (0.000105) (6.98e-05) (4.96e-05) (2.42e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.133*** -0.0688** -0.0377* -0.0122 
 (0.0478) (0.0320) (0.0227) (0.0111) 
dir 0.0545* 0.0296 0.0219 0.00557 
 (0.0295) (0.0197) (0.0140) (0.00682) 
comp_comit 0.0253 0.0382 0.0326 -0.0113 
 (0.0947) (0.0633) (0.0449) (0.0219) 
ma -0.169*** -0.0823*** -0.0321** 0.00107 
 (0.0334) (0.0224) (0.0159) (0.00774) 
internet 0.207*** 0.0659* -0.0399 -0.0142 
 (0.0520) (0.0348) (0.0247) (0.0120) 
silicon_valley 0.130*** 0.0123 -0.0502*** -0.00415 
 (0.0268) (0.0179) (0.0127) (0.00620) 
Constant 0.302*** 0.166*** 0.113*** 0.0369*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0268) (0.0190) (0.00928) 
     
Observations 1156 1156 1156 1156 
R-squared 0.055 0.023 0.033 0.010 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.7 – Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SUCCESS variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for top executives, HIGH_TECH cut 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 75th 90th 95th 99th 
     
tdc 1.87e-07 2.51e-07 1.31e-07 5.55e-08 
 (6.68e-07) (4.41e-07) (3.37e-07) (1.92e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.0235 -0.0178 -0.0292 0.00428 
 (0.0884) (0.0584) (0.0446) (0.0255) 
salary -0.000351** -0.000243** -9.86e-05 -3.49e-05 
 (0.000169) (0.000112) (8.52e-05) (4.87e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.209** -0.138** -0.0867* -0.0344 
 (0.104) (0.0684) (0.0522) (0.0298) 
dir 0.107 -0.0717 -0.143*** -0.133*** 
 (0.104) (0.0688) (0.0525) (0.0300) 
comp_comit 0.0571 0.0670 0.0276 -0.00331 
 (0.115) (0.0758) (0.0578) (0.0331) 
ma -0.114 0.0138 0.0348 0.0351 
 (0.0753) (0.0498) (0.0380) (0.0217) 
internet 0.115 -0.0759 -0.0277 0.0184 
 (0.123) (0.0809) (0.0618) (0.0353) 
silicon_valley 0.121** -0.000925 -0.0412 -0.0157 
 (0.0584) (0.0386) (0.0294) (0.0168) 
Constant 0.334*** 0.305*** 0.278*** 0.162*** 
 (0.120) (0.0792) (0.0605) (0.0346) 
     
Observations 244 244 244 244 
R-squared 0.063 0.059 0.077 0.126 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.8 - Regressions of compensation and control variables on the binary SUCCESS variable evaluated at varying percentiles 
of market cap growth over NASDAQ for top executives, outliers (grwth_abv_nas > 10) removed, HIGH_TECH cut 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 75th 90th 95th 99th 
     
tdc 1.50e-07 1.67e-07 9.84e-08 7.98e-08 
 (6.69e-07) (4.50e-07) (3.32e-07) (1.77e-07) 
tdc_equity_pct -0.00791 -0.0237 -0.00811 -0.0166 
 (0.0888) (0.0597) (0.0441) (0.0235) 
salary -0.000307* -0.000222* -0.000129 -5.68e-05 
 (0.000170) (0.000114) (8.44e-05) (4.49e-05) 
options_ex_per_unex -0.166 -0.116 -0.0792 -0.0330 
 (0.104) (0.0702) (0.0519) (0.0276) 
dir 0.254** 0.0896 0.0109 -0.0407 
 (0.112) (0.0750) (0.0554) (0.0295) 
comp_comit 0.0406 0.0484 0.0102 -0.00767 
 (0.115) (0.0773) (0.0571) (0.0304) 
ma -0.152** -0.0576 -0.0165 0.0207 
 (0.0769) (0.0517) (0.0382) (0.0203) 
internet 0.161 -0.0231 -0.0595 -0.0342 
 (0.126) (0.0848) (0.0627) (0.0334) 
silicon_valley 0.141** 0.0258 -0.0472 -0.00216 
 (0.0590) (0.0396) (0.0293) (0.0156) 
Constant 0.156 0.145* 0.143** 0.0935*** 
 (0.127) (0.0850) (0.0629) (0.0335) 
     
Observations 240 240 240 240 
R-squared 0.072 0.038 0.040 0.035 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
